Europe can defend Ukraine without the US - and it must

Only Europe can defend itself against Russian imperialism. We have the capacity. We simply need the will.

Photo by Max Kukurudziak on Unsplash

The main thing we need right now is clarity. It is supremely important that we do not become muddled.

Keir Starmer's visit to the White House yesterday was generally well received. The British right were thwarted in their clear desire to see Donald Trump publicly humiliate him. There was a fairly warm reception to the Chagos deal and some mention of avoiding tariffs. That all secured some rare front page praise today, with the Mail saying "what an unlikely bromance", the Telegraph saying "Trump backs Starmer on Chagos" and the Times emphasising a possible trade deal. The PM's team will consider that a good day at work. Britain is managing to hide in the undergrowth while this demented gorilla goes on the warpath.

Unfortunately, none of it means anything. The one supreme matter of historic importance at the moment concerns American security guarantees for Ukraine. Without them, there is no Nato. Without them, there is a significantly increased incentive for Russia to continue a policy of imperial expansionism. Without them, we inch closer and closer to European powers entering into direct military conflict with Russia.

But on this point Starmer failed to secure any meaningful assurance at all, just like Emmanuel Macron earlier in the week. You can't fault either man. They did their best. But the basic truth is that they came back empty handed. "Could you take on Russia by yourselves?" Trump asked Starmer yesterday, a vicious reptilian smile plastered across his face. And in that joke, and the laughter that surrounded it, was the death of Nato, the end of any meaningful US commitment to Europe, the rejection of a united West, a once-great power turned into a small dog that bares its stomach to Russian tyranny.

It's suddenly possible to fully understand what it was like to live in the 1930s. In retrospect, events took on this sense of grinding tectonic inevitability. But in truth, there was nothing inevitable about them whatsoever. At every stage, the worst outcome could be avoided. It could have been avoided by maintaining a firewall against cooperation with fascists. It could have been prevented by intervening militarily when Germany was still weak enough to be fairly easily defeated. It could have been prevented by showing strength and commitment when it was needed, rather than equivocation.

This is what is required of Europe today: Commitment, clarity, confidence, planning and strength. This is disparaged as warmongering by Putin's apologists on left and right. In fact it is the opposite. It is the best way to prevent further war.

Can it be done? The answer to that, categorically, is yes.

Russia has ramped-up its war machine since the start of the conflict. Last year, it produced and refurbished roughly 1,550 tanks, 5,700 armoured vehicles and 450 artillery pieces. It is also being supplied by its allies, like Iran and North Korea, with drones, rockets, artillery systems and shells. It spent approximately £115.9 billion last year - or 6.7% of GDP. It is basically running a war economy.

Over the course of the year, that spending allowed Russia to capture 4,168 square kilometres of Ukraine as part of a strategy to maximise territorial acquisitions ahead of a Trump presidency. It has done this by shoveling its own people into the meat grinder. Since the start of the war, Russian casualty estimates killed or wounded range from 600,000 to 750,000.

How has the Ukrainian resistance been funded? Almost exactly 50/50 by Europe and the US. Analysis by the Kiel Institute found that US military support has amounted to £52.8 billion since the start of the war, with Europe and the UK sending another £51.2 billion.

Europe could replace US contributions by raiding the £151 billion in frozen Russian assets held by Euroclear, the Belgian-based clearing house. Or it could simply spend 0.12% of its GDP. This is a perfectly feasible increase in spending. There is no insurmountable practical obstacle to it, only a political reluctance to do the right thing.

The problem is not so much money but resources. Ukraine relies on certain US strategic enablers. These include the Starlink system for basic communication and satellite surveillance for intelligence. The exact extent of this reliance is not clear, because the information obviously isn't publicly released, but we know it's important. The US appears to have used the prospect of losing access to Starlink as leverage to force Ukraine into a deal over minerals. Hopefully, President Zelenskyy's willingness to sign this deal, which is nowhere near as pernicious as it initially appeared, will secure continued access to Starlink. There are alternatives if needs be, but they are suboptimal. One analyst described the problem as follows: "Not insurmountable, but very inconvenient." That’s a pretty good summary of the general problem of replacing US contributions in Ukraine.

There is also an issue with equipment. For years, Europe has lagged behind America in terms of defence. The US defence budget last year was 3.32% of GDP. Europe's was 1.74%. As a recent International Institute for Strategic Studies report found: "The high level of attrition in the Ukraine War has painfully highlighted European countries’ current shortcomings." Europe must now "significantly increase their readiness levels, close critical capability areas, strengthen their defence-industrial bases and make long-term financial investments in forces and defence innovation".

Ukraine relies on the US for certain equipment. Some of this can be swapped out for European versions. US Abrams tanks can be switched for European Leopards. The US Patriot air defense system has European alternatives, like Germany's IRIS-T and Norway's NASAMS. Ukraine's US-made F-16 fighter aircraft are all supplied by European countries.

But there is US equipment which is difficult to replace, including armoured vehicles. Ostensibly, this shouldn't be a problem. We could just buy the equipment from the US while Europe levels up its own production. Indeed, this is basically what's been happening anyway. Around half the money the US gives to Ukraine actually goes straight to the US defence industry.

This should be a simple transactional Trump-friendly deal, but we can't rely on that. He is changeable, highly emotional, susceptible to whatever he last heard and clearly instinctively pro-autocrat. It’s possible to imagine US support for Russia becoming so entrenched they refuse to sell Ukraine equipment. True European independence means planning for that outcome.

Are there other countries we could source equipment from? Yes, to a certain degree. South Korea is a good bet, with a growing defence industry and a strong incentive to make sure that North Korea learns a painful lesson from its participation in Ukraine. Again, the same principle applies. The problems are very inconvenient, but not insurmountable. They require diligence, planning and political will,.

We should be honest. There is no outcome of American withdrawal which is as good as what we have now. Ukraine will be weaker. We should also be clear that even in the current circumstance Ukraine is on the backfoot.

But Russia is not some kind of superpower. It can be held back and it can be defeated.

If the conflict continues, it'll need another round of mobilisation to make up for the recruits it has funnelled into its human meat grinder. They'll be able to get those troops, but each time they have to resort to it, it becomes more painful and politically dangerous. At their current rate of loss they'll run out of refurbished armoured vehicles around the end of the year as well. These will need replenishing. They also have problems when it comes to artillery barrels, which get worn out and become unreliable. Its army is in an absolute state, which is why they rely on the meat grinder. They replace sophistication with a complete indifference to human life.

There is a potentially decisive problem with its economy. This is the subject of a very lively debate which Lawrence Freedman summarised here. Some believe that Russia can survive the economic problems it faces. Others think it could be reaching a crisis point already. Others that a crisis point is coming but it's really not clear when. Perhaps in three years. Perhaps in one.

Either way, there are solid realistic reasons to hold out and hope for better days later in the conflict. Ukraine wants to keep on fighting. Europe should want the same. The longer Russia is tied up in Ukraine, the harder it is for it to replenish its forces and pose a threat to another European state, including the nightmare scenario of an invasion against an EU or Nato member.

Ukraine fights for all of Europe. That has always been true and it's never more true than it is now. Now Europe must support it, as it supports us.

Odds and sods

I've linked to them throughout the piece but this piece would have been impossible without the work of experts in the field. Rusi is an absolute godsend, with countless experts to call on and reports to digest. The IISS is essential. I relied particularly on their report on building European defence strategy and the Military Balance 2025. The Kiel institute is putting out essential work on European defence and funding, with this report being particularly useful. See you next week, which will hopefully be cheerier than this one.